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INTRODUCTION 
While China has not joined the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WCT) or the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), China amended its Copyright Law in 2001 
in accordance with Article 8 of the WCT and Articles 10 and 14 of the 
WPPT. As a result, a new exclusive right of communication through the 
information network (hereafter referred to as the ‘right of network 
communication’) was introduced into the Copyright Law 1990 (amended 
2001) for the benefit of copyright owners and performers and producers 
of sound and video recordings. 
The adoption of the right of network communication has raised the level 
of copyright protection as required by Article 8 of the WCT and Articles 
10 and 14 of the WPPT. Consequently, uploading a work or recording 
onto a website for unauthorised distribution through the Internet will 
infringe the copyright owner, producer and performer’s (if the recording 
embodies the performance) right of network communication, unless the 
distribution constitutes fair use. 
However, since the provision on the right of network communication in 
the Copyright Law has a liberal application, more needs to be done to 
properly apply this right in complicated cases. In addition, the new 
technologies and business models appearing in China bring new 
challenges which call for clarification on the meaning of the network 
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communication right, and either creating or improving provisions in the 
Copyright Law. 
For example, when a website provides hyperlinks to infringing MP3 
files, or ‘pirated’ sites containing a number of infringing files, will the 
website operator be directly responsible for infringing the right of 
network communication, or for indirectly contributing to the infringing 
act done by the linked sites? Moreover, if the copyright owner sues the 
website providing the hyperlinks, but does not give a written notice 
warning it of the infringing nature of the linked files or sites in advance, 
can the court determine that the website has actual knowledge of the 
infringing act occurring on the linked site? There are no clear answers to 
these questions in the Copyright Law. 
To deal with these new challenges the State Council drated the Regulation 
on the Protection of the Right of Communication through the Information Network 
(‘Communication Right Regulation’),1 and the Supreme Court is trying to give 
interpretations on the right of network communication in specific cases. 
Nevertheless there are still disputes over the application of this new 
right. The competing interest groups, which include major record labels 
and the Internet industry, have opposing views, which makes it difficult 
for new legislation and judicial interpretation. 
This paper explores the nature of the new right of network 
communication in China and discusses its relationship with other 
exclusive rights, in particular the right of reproduction and the right of 
distribution. This paper also identifies the hotly debated questions in 
relation to applying the right of network communication and attempts to 
provide answers. In addition, the paper provides a proposal to introduce 
specific provisions of indirect copyright infringement and insights on the 
judicial test that should be applied by the courts in determining an act of 
indirect infringement. 
 
                                                        
1 Since this chapter was written, the State Council of PRC has promulgated the Regulation 
on Protection of the Right of Communication via Information Networks on 18 May 2006 as Decree 
No. 468, effective as of 1 July 2006. 
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THE BACKGROUND TO THE NETWORK 
COMMUNICATION RIGHT IN CHINA 
The first Copyright Law in the People’s Republic of China was adopted in 
1990. Unlike most Western copyright laws, it provides without any 
definitions an open list of exclusive economic rights:  
Article 10: Copyright includes the following moral rights and property 
rights: 
(5) The right of exploitation and the right to remuneration, that 
is, the right of exploiting work by means of reproduction, 
performance, broadcasting, exhibition distribution, making 
cinematographic film, television or video, adaptation, 
translation, annotation, compilation and the like, and the right 
of authorising others to exploit one's work through the above-
mentioned means, and of receiving remuneration as a result. 
When the Internet became a major means of disseminating work in 
China, the courts had to consider whether Article 10 granted copyright 
owners an exclusive right to control the act of uploading their works to a 
website for browsing or downloading. In 2000, Wang Men and five 
other well-known writers discovered that their novels could be freely 
downloaded from a website without their consent. The six writers sued 
the website and the case was referred to as ‘the first copyright case in the 
network environment’ (hereafter referred to as the ‘Six Writers’ case’). 
It should be noted that the Copyright Law 1990 did not provide a general 
right of communication to the public. Furthermore, the broadcasting 
right provided in Article 10 does not cover on-demand transmission on 
a point-to-point basis through the Internet. This is because the Regulation 
for the Implementation of the Copyright Law issued by the State Council in 
1991 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Copyright Implementation Regulation1991’) 
clearly states that: 
Broadcasting is the communication of works through wireless 
radio waves and cable television system.2 
                                                        
2 Regulation for the Implementation of the Copyright Law (1991) art 5 [3].  
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Since the transmission occurred on the Internet it is technically different 
from wireless radio waves and the cable television system, which means 
that communicating works on-line is more than an act of broadcasting. 
Thereafter, it is practically impossible for the court to interpret the 
broadcasting right widely because of the strict wording in the Copyright 
Implementation Regulation1991. 
Nevertheless it may be possible to treat the website’s act as a 
‘distribution’ of work since the Copyright Implementation Regulation1991 
defines ‘distribution’ as the: 
provision of copies of a work to the public by means such as 
sale and rental etc, in so far as the number of copies satisfy the 
reasonable need of the public.3 
Since the result of uploading a work onto an openly accessible website is 
to make copies of the work available to the public, it is arguable that 
uploading the work is an act of providing copies of the work by a new 
means, in addition to sale and rental.4 Moreover, the United States 
Information Infrastructure Task Force stressed that ‘the transmission 
results essentially in the distribution’, and supports the view that the 
existing right of distribution encompasses transmitting copies through 
the Internet.5 
However the terms ‘sale’ and ‘rental’ have specific meanings, which are 
different to the meanings these terms have in common law countries 
such as the United States. It is well-established that ‘sale’ in legal terms 
involves the transfer of ownership of a real thing, while ‘rental’ is the 
delivery of a real thing to another.6 A ‘real thing’ in most cases indicates 
                                                        
3 Regulation for the Implementation of the Copyright Law (1991) art 5 [5].  
4 Even after the new network communication right was introduced into the Copyright Law 
in 2001, some people still argue that making works available through the Internet is an act 
of distribution that should be controlled by the right of distribution. See Gui Run, 
‘Comment on Wang Men vs. Beijing OnLine’, China Intellectual Property Right Newspaper, 13 
August 2003.  
5 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure (the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights), 
Washington DC (1995) 219-20. 
6 ‘Sale’ is defined by Contract Law as the transfer of ownership of an object, while ‘rental’ is 
defined as a delivery of an object for another’s use. See Contract Law (PRC) art 130 and art 
212. 
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a tangible thing, and intangible information embodied in a medium is 
not a ‘thing’. As a consequence, although network users can download a 
copy of a work from a website, this process does not involve the 
transferring of ownership, or delivery of any ‘real thing’. Most academics 
and judges find it strange that online-transmission, which does not lend 
itself to any physical movement of a real thing, can be combined with 
sale and rental as a form of distribution.  
Uploading a work to the network server produces a new digital copy of 
the work and as a consequence this may involve the right of 
reproduction. The Copyright Implementation Regulation 1991 defines 
‘reproduction’ as: 
Reproduction is the act of making one or more copies of a 
work by means like printing, photocopying, copying by hand, 
rubbing, audio-recording, video-recording, re-recording or 
photographing etc.7 
Unlike the definition of ‘reproduction’ in the United States and 
Australian copyright acts which describe a test to determine whether 
certain acts constitute a reproduction,8  the definition in the Copyright 
Implementation Regulation 1991 only lists various means of reproducing 
works. However there is no difficulty in interpreting the act of uploading 
as an act of reproduction because a new copy of the work is made and 
the list given in the definition is not closed. The most important 
consequence of uploading a work onto an open website is not that a 
new copy is created, but that the new copy is accessible by the public 
who are able to browse or download the copy. Thus, while the act of 
uploading a work does involve reproducing the work, it is not 
appropriate to say that the act only infringes the exclusive right of 
reproduction. The contrary conclusion will equate to the act of 
communicating a work through the Internet to the mere act of 
photocopying it. 
Since none of the exclusive rights in Article 10 of the Copyright Law 1990 
were applicable to the act of communicating works through the Internet, 
                                                        
7 Regulation for the Implementation of the Copyright Law (1991) art 5[1]. 
8 17 USC 101; Copyright Act (Cth), s 31(1)(a)(i). 
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a new exclusive right would have to be inferred from the Article and 
invoked by the court. 
In the Six Writers’ case judges were enlightened by Article 8 of the WCT. 
The judges formed the view that through judicial interpretation any new 
right may be added to the list of exclusive rights in Article 10, since the 
list is open to future development.9 The decision delivered by the Beijing 
Haidian District Court states that: 
The explicitly listed ways of exploiting works in Paragraph 5, 
Article 10 of the Copyright Law 1990 does not close the 
possibility of other ways by which works might be exploited . . . 
Thus the communication of works through the Internet should 
be determined as a new way of exploiting works. The copyright 
owner has the right to decide whether or not to allow the work 
to be communicated via the Internet . . . Despite the differences 
that exist between the communication of works on the Internet 
and the publication, distribution, public performance and 
broadcasting of works, all of them in nature are for the purpose 
of realising communication (works) to the public and the 
exploitation of works, thus allowing the audience or viewers to 
have access to the content of works. The difference in the 
means of communications does not affect the right of copyright 
owners to control such communications.10 
The court made the decision in favor of the six writers and this was 
confirmed by the Beijing Number 1 Intermediate Court. However only 
laws passed by the People’s Congress can create exclusive rights for the 
author of works, so the legal basis for the broad interpretation of Article 
10 has been widely questioned. 11  Under these circumstances new 
legislative action became the only solution to eliminate the doubts 
surrounding the application of copyright law to the Internet. 
                                                        
9 Zhang Hui, (The Analysis of) Six Writers vs. Beijing On-line on Copyright Dispute 
<http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2003/11/17/1311.htm> at 25 January 2008; the 
author is also a judge in the Supreme Court. 
10 Civil Judgment (1999) No 57, Intellectual Property Branch, First Instance, Beijing 
Haidian District Court. The wording of this judgement has been slightly modified. 
11 Zhang Guangliang, ‘(The Analysis of) Six Writers vs. Beijing On-line on Copyright 
Dispute’ (2000) Spring Journal of Science, Technology and Law, 88; Zhang Pin, ‘The Effect of 
Copyright Law in the Internet’ (2000) Spring Journal of Science, Technology and Law, 92. 
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THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF NETWORK 
COMMUNICATION IN CHINA 
The right of network communication is a primary exclusive 
right in China 
In 2001 the People’s Congress amended the Copyright Law 1990 and a 
new right of communication through the information network was 
explicitly granted to copyright owners, performers and producers of 
sound and video recordings. The relevant provisions are:  
Article 10: Copyright includes the following moral rights and 
property rights: 
(12) The right of communication through the information 
network, that is, the right to make a work available to the public 
by wire or by wireless means, so that people may have access to 
the work from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them. 
Article 37: The performer shall, in respect of his or her 
performance, enjoy the following rights: 
(6) To authorise making his or her performance available to the 
public through the information network, and receive 
remuneration as a result. 
Article 41: The producer of a sound recording or video 
recording shall enjoy the right to authorise . . . reproducing, 
distributing or renting the sound recording or video recording 
or making it available to the public through the information 
network and to receive remuneration as a result  
It should be noted that although Articles 37 and 41 use the term the 
‘right to authorise’, the two articles grant the performer and producer an 
exclusive primary right, rather than a secondary authorisation right in 
terms of the ‘right to approve, countenance or sanction’ as is provided in 
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common law jurisdictions.12 Unlike the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Australia, there is no general concept of a ‘secondary right’ in 
Chinese copyright law theory. ‘The right to authorise’ in the Copyright 
Law 1990 means that the owner has the right to do certain acts by him 
or herself and has the right to authorise others to do the same. As such, 
the right to authorise is actually a sub-right inherent to any exclusive 
right enjoyed by the copyright owner. The six rights granted to 
performers in Article 37 and the four rights granted to producers of 
sound and video recordings in Article 41 are defined as ‘the right to 
authorise others to do’ certain acts. Even seen from the perspective of 
the legislature in common law countries it is absurd that a copyright law 
would only create various secondary rights for performers and 
producers, without first creating a primary right.13 
The right of network communication is a new exclusive right in 
China 
It is obvious that Article 10 of the Copyright Law 1990 (amended 2001) 
originates from Article 8 of the WCT. However Article 8 of the WCT is 
the result of a compromise between the competing positions of the 
United States and the European Union delegations on the wording of 
the right to control on-demand communication.14 Article 8 has been 
referred to as an ‘umbrella solution’ because it does not order member 
states to adopt a new right, but rather gives member states the power to 
decide which exclusive right should be used to cover the act of making 
works available through the Internet.15 In implementing Article 8 of the 
                                                        
12 US17 USC 106; Copyright Act C s 3(1); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 13(2). See also Falcon v 
Famous Players Film Co [1926] 2 KB 474, Muzak Corp v Composers, Authors and Publishers 
Association of Canada Ltd [1953] 2 SCR 182, Moorhouse v University of New South Wales [1976] 
RPC 151. 
13 For the same reason, Professor Andrew Christie and other commentators argue that 
Article 8 of the WCT embodies an exclusive primary right despite the fact that Article 8 
grants an exclusive right of authorising communication to the public. See Andrew Christie 
and Eloise Dias, ‘The New Right of Communication in Australia’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law 
Review 237, 244. 
14 See World Intellectual Property Organisation, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of 
the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the protection of literary and Artistic Works to be 
Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, August 30 1996, Article 10, CRNR/DC/4. 
15 Mihály Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet: the 1996 WIPO Treaties, Their 
Interpretation and Implementation (2002) 493. 
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WCT many member states chose to use one or more existing traditional 
rights to encompass the relevant acts of network transmission. For 
example, the United States did not add any new exclusive right in its 
Copyright Act after it ratified the WCT. Instead the combination of the 
right of distribution, reproduction, public performance and public 
display are applied by courts in the United States to control the act of 
network transmission.16 
In China the ‘umbrella’ itself became a single new exclusive right in the 
Copyright Law 1990 (amended 2001). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, 
as indicated by the Six Writers’ case, judges have refused to apply 
traditional exclusive rights to the Internet environment. Secondly, there 
is no general right of communication in the Copyright Law 1990 that can 
be appropriately expanded to cover on-line communication. As a result 
the legislature could choose to create a new right, and the easiest way to 
do so would be to make any new right an additional new right for 
Chinese copyright owners, pursuant to Article 8 of the WCT. 
As a result the definition of the new right of network communication in 
Article 10 paragraph 12 of the Copyright Law 1990 (amended 2001) is 
virtually a verbatim translation of part of the second half of Article 8 of 
the WCT. This kind of borrowing allows the Chinese copyright 
legislation to be consistent with the WCT. 
The application of the right of network communication in 
China 
Since the Copyright Law 1990 (amended 2001) came into force anyone 
without authorisation who uploads copyrighted work onto an openly 
accessible Internet site infringes the right of network communication. 
Once the work is uploaded anybody can browse it online, or download it 
onto a computer connected to the Internet. Such an act falls within the 
definition of the right of network communication and is precisely what 
the new right is designed to cover. 
In the first case involving the right of network communication Chen 
Xingliang v National Digital Library Ltd, the defendant without consent 
                                                        
16 DMCA, Section 104 Report: A Report of the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to 104 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, (August 2001) 94. 
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scanned three books written by the plaintiff and provided an on-line 
reading and downloading service to its registered users. The plaintiff 
sued for infringement on his right of network communication and was 
awarded a favourable judgement with damages. The Beijing Haidian 
District Court differentiated between the traditional paper-based library 
and the digital library that involves communication of digital work. The 
court stressed that communicating work through a network enlarges the 
scope of communication to such an extent that it goes beyond what the 
author would expect in publishing the work in the traditional way, and 
therefore such communication should be restricted by the right of 
network communication. The case is significant in that the defendant is 
a national and government-supported digital library under the direct 
control of the National Library of China. 17  The decision also fully 
implemented the Copyright Law 1990 (amended 2001) without any undue 
influence by the defendant. 
In Zheng Chengsi v Sursen Digital Technology Inc the defendant operated an 
online digital library that provided the plaintiff’s scanned books for 
registered users to read.18 Although the defendant employed measures 
preventing users from downloading its digital books and only allowed 
three users to read the same book at the same time, the Beijing Haidian 
District Court found against the defendant. The court declared that the 
technological restrictions did not change the nature of the defendant’s 
infringing acts in making the plaintiff’s works available for users’ 
through the Internet, without authorisation.19 
In Warner Music v Rongshuxia Computer Inc the defendant operated a 
popular, literature website which provided MP3s for on-line sampling. 
Ten of these MP3s came from CDs produced by the plaintiff. The 
defendant argued that its act was fair use since it was for personal use 
and the defendant did not charge any fee from its users. The Shanghai 
                                                        
17 See the introduction to the National Digital Library of China on the website of the 
NDLC and National Library of China, <http://www.d-library.com.cn/index.jsp> at 25 
January 2008, <http://www.nlc.gov.cn/>. 
18 Zheng Chensi is a Professor and Director of the Intellectual Property Center in the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science. There are five other professors who brought a 
lawsuit on the same facts and legal grounds against Sursen Digital Technology Inc. The 
defendant lost all of these lawsuits both in the first and appellate court. 
19 See Beijing Haidian District Court, Civil Judgment (2004) No 12509. 
Copyright law, digital content and the Internet in the Asia-Pacific 197  
Number 2 Intermediate Court rejected the fair use defence by 
emphasising the potential harm the defendant caused on the plaintiff’s 
economic interests.20 
Since Article 8 of the WCT does not specify what exactly constitutes the 
act of making a work available, the direct translation of this article 
without further clarification can lead to ambiguity and confusion. 
 
THE NEW PROBLEMS WITH THE RIGHT OF 
NETWORK COMMUNICATION IN CHINA: WHEN 
DOES AN ISP INFRINGE THE RIGHT? 
Background 
At present, the most prominent question is: who makes the 
communication? As mentioned, the definition of the network 
communication right in Copyright Law 1990 (amended 2001) is an exact 
translation of Article 8 of the WCT. The latter does not shed light on 
who is the person making the communication, but does exclude the 
possibility that the provider of physical facilities that enable or creates a 
communication makes the communication.21 
It is evident from previous cases involving infringement on the right of 
network communication that uploading works onto an open Internet 
site is an act of communicating works.22 However it is unclear whether 
merely providing hyperlinks to works residing on other Internet sites 
amounts to a communication of that work. 
The answer to this question is significant in that copyright owners are 
trying to sue hyperlink providers for infringing their rights of network 
                                                        
20 See Shanghai No 2 Intermediate Court, Civil Judgment (2003) Er Min Chu Zi No. 21. 
21 The Agreed statement concerning Article 8 of the WCT states, ‘It is understood that 
the mere provision of physical facilities does not in itself amount to communication 
within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that 
nothing in Article 8 precludes a Contracting Party from applying Article 11bis(2).’. See 
further <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf> at 15 
January 2008. 
22 See the above mentioned civil judgments. 
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communication. If the act of providing hyperlinks is not deemed 
communication then the provision of hyperlinks is not a direct 
infringement on the network communication right.  
ISP’s liability of joint tortfeasor in China 
In copyright theory a direct or primary copyright infringement is 
commonly understood as doing something that only the copyright 
owner has the right to do, without the consent of the copyright owner.23 
In other words, if an act is explicitly restricted by an exclusive right, 
doing such an act without the copyright owner’s authorisation 
constitutes a direct or primary copyright infringement. If an act is not 
under the direct control of any exclusive right, it is not a direct or 
primary copyright infringement. 
This does not mean that acts which are not directly restricted by 
exclusive rights cannot lead to a copyright infringement. If a person 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, with 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the conduct, that person’s act may 
be considered a contributory infringement (or indirect or secondary 
infringement).24 
In common law countries merely providing hyperlinks to infringing files 
stored on other sites is not a direct or primary copyright infringement.25 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (hereinafter referred as to the 
DMCA) provides a ‘safe harbor’ to service providers who link users to 
an online location containing infringing material, provided the service 
providers do not have actual knowledge of the infringing material, or are 
                                                        
23 A typical example is the definition of ‘copyright infringement’ in the Copyright Act C s 
27(1) which states, ‘It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the 
consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the 
copyright has the right to do.’ 
24 Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management Inc, 443 F 2d 1159, 1162 (2nd Cir, 
1971). It should be noted that the embodiment of the theory of indirect infringement in 
the United States is different from that in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. In 
the United States there is no explicit provision of indirect infringement in either the 1909 
or 1976 Copyright Act and the US courts have developed the rule of contributory copyright 
over the years. In a contrast, the UK Copyright Act enumerates various secondary 
infringement acts: see Copyright Act (UK) ss 22-26. 
25 B Melvile and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (2003) ch 12B.05 [A][2]. 
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unaware of the circumstances from which the infringing activity is 
apparent, and that they act expeditiously to disable access to the material 
after being notified or becoming aware of the infringement.26  
The concept of ‘indirect copyright infringement’ does not appear in 
either the 1990 or 2001 Copyright Law of China. However the legal rule 
that a person should take liability for a third person under some 
circumstances, does exist in civil law. Article 130 of the General Principles 
of the Civil Law (hereafter referred to as the ‘Civil Law’) states that: 
If two or more persons jointly infringe upon another person's 
rights and cause damage, they shall bear joint liability. 
Furthermore the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Civil Law (hereafter 
referred to as ‘Civil Law Interpretation’) states that: 
Any person who incites or assists another to commit a tort is 
the joint tortfeasor. 
‘To assist’ has a similar meaning as that of ‘to contribute’, which makes it 
reasonable to claim that the concept of ‘contributory infringement’ exists 
in China. As a matter of fact, Article 130 of the Civil Law and its 
accompanying judicial interpretation is the legal ground on which the 
service provider’s liability is based. Article 4 of the Judicial Interpretation 
Regarding Various Issues on the Application of Laws While Adjudicating Disputes 
relating to Computer Networks Copyright (Networks Copyright Interpretation) 
provides that: 
In case an Internet Server Provider participates in any other 
person's act of infringement on copyright through networks, or 
abets any other person to commit, or assists any other person in 
committing an act of copyright infringement, the court shall 
impose joint liability of the Internet Server Provider with the 
others directly committing the infringement act according to 
the provisions of Article 130 of the General Principles of the Civil 
Law. 
                                                        
26 17 USCS § 512(d). It should be noted that paragraph [2] also provides that the service 
provide ‘does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, 
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity’. 
This is the embodiment of the ‘vicarious liability’ theory, but not of ‘contributory 
infringement’. 
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Article 5 goes on to state that:  
In the event that an Internet Server Provider in providing 
content services has actual knowledge of the internet users' acts 
of infringement on other people's copyright through networks, 
or who has been given warnings with good evidence by the 
owner of the copyright, but fails to take measures including 
removing the infringing content etc, to eliminate the 
infringement, the people's court shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 130 of the General Principles of the Civil Law, 
impose joint liability on the Internet Server Provider and the 
Internet users. 
Article 5 of the Networks Copyright Interpretation is a Chinese version of 
‘notice and takedown’ and the second safe harbor as provided by Article 
512, subsection (c) of the DMCA. However, two questions remain after 
the Supreme Court issued the Networks Copyright Interpretation. First, 
Article 5 only covers the activities of content service providers who 
store material on their network system at the direction of the users. The 
act of providing hyperlinks to material stored on other network systems 
is not included within the scope of the application of Article 5. 
Second, Article 5 only imposes joint liability on those content service 
providers who ‘have actual knowledge’ of the users’ infringing activities, 
but it is silent on how to determine what constitutes ‘actual knowledge’. 
It is highly unlikely that when the service provider is served with good 
evidence through a notice of claimed infringement, that the service 
provider then has ‘actual knowledge’ of the possible infringement. But is 
the notification the only way to give the service provider actual 
knowledge of the existence of others’ infringement? In addition, should 
court make a determination that a service provider ‘should have known’ 
of others’ infringing activity, if it would be apparent to a reasonable 
person under the same circumstances? 
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Conflicting views amongst Chinese courts 
Universal Music Group v chinamp3.com 
The first question was first discussed in Universal Music Group v 
chinamp3.com.27 The defendant operated a professional music website, but 
did not store any music files on its web server. Instead, it created 
categories of music files on its site such as ‘Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Zone’ and ‘US and European Zone’, in which the names of artists were 
displayed by alphabetical order. When a user clicked the name of an 
artist, it displayed hyperlinks to the artist’s songs. By clicking those 
hyperlinks, a user could directly download music files stored on other 
Internet sites. 
The plaintiff was the producer of sound recordings which were available 
to download through the defendant’s hyperlinks. The plaintiff had never 
authorised a website to provide a downloading service, and claimed that 
the thirty-five song titles linked by the defendant were infringing. The 
plaintiff sued the defendant for infringing its ‘legitimate right’ and 
requested the defendant to stop providing communication and 
downloading services through the network. 
The cause of action was somewhat ambiguous since the plaintiff did not 
clarify whether it sued the defendant for directly infringing the network 
communication right, or for assisting the linked website to commit the 
direct infringement. The Beijing No1 Intermediate Court, in the 
judgement handed down in favour of the defendant, claimed that the 
focus of the dispute was ‘whether the act of communicating works to 
the public by means of providing hyperlink is an infringement of the 
plaintiff’s right’.28  
In its analysis the court first noted that the defendant not only searched 
other websites for music files, but also aggregated, arranged and 
organised hyperlinks to the selected and recommended files. Secondly, 
the court stressed the fact that users can directly search and download 
                                                        
27 Warner Music Co. and Sony BMG Music Entertainment (Hong Kong) Ltd also 
brought a lawsuit against the operator of <http://www.chinamp3.com> on the same 
legal grounds and similar factual backgrounds. All of the three lawsuits had the same 
outcomes both in the first and second instance.  
28 See Beijing No 1 Intermediary Court, Civil Judgment (2004) Yi Min Chu Zi No 400. 
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songs by visiting the defendant’s website, rather than visiting the linked 
websites. In the court’s view the defendant’s website was in the position 
of communicating works from beginning to end, while the linked 
websites only functioned as ‘periphery storage’. The court determined 
that the defendant had a duty of care on the legality of its downloading 
service and was negligent for not screening the linked resources. The 
court declared that ‘the defendant’s act of providing hyperlinks did not 
provide a corridor’ to the works, but was rather ‘an act of 
communicating works to the public’.29 
It is apparent that the court treated the defendant’s act of providing links 
to the infringing files as communicating works to the public, not 
assisting others to communicate works. This position is confirmed by 
the legal grounds on which the court based its conclusion. The court 
quoted Article 41 (the right of network information granted to 
producers of sound recordings) and Article 47 of the Copyright Law 1990 
(amended 2001) (liability for infringement on the exclusive rights including 
the right of network information), but did not mention Article 130 of 
the Civil Law regarding joint tortfeasors. 
On appeal the Beijing High Court overruled the judgement given by the 
district court. The High Court pointed out that (emphasis added): 
‘The appellant (the defendant in the first instance) was not able 
to fully control the linked resources. If the linked website 
operator changes the URL address or employs a code to restrict 
access, then access to the linked resources will be denied. 
Therefore, in nature, the service provided by the appellant in the present 
case is still a service of providing a corridor. The appellant does not 
reproduce or communicate to the public the linked sound recordings. 
Nevertheless, the appellant’s act of creating links facilitates 
communication of the infringing sound recordings. By enabling 
users to download infringing sound recordings, the appellant 
causes infringing activities on the linked websites to be 
performed and extended. As a result, the appellant objectively 
participates in and assists the infringing activities that were 
                                                        
29 Beijing No. 1 Intermediary People’s Court, Civil Judgment (2004) Yi Zhong Min Chu Zi 
No. 400. 
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performed on the linked websites and thus harms the legitimate 
interests enjoyed by the respondent.’30 
Clearly the High Court did not agree that providing links to infringing 
works constituted a communication of works. Instead the High Court 
held that the act contributed to the directly infringing activity which 
occurred on the linked websites. In addition, the High Court cited 
Article 130 of the Civil Law and Article 4 of the Networks Copyright 
Interpretation on ‘joint tortfeasor’ in determining the contributory 
infringing nature of the appellant’s act, and its subsequent liability. 
The High Court also addressed the appellant’s knowledge of the 
infringing nature of the linked files. The appellant had argued that 
Article 5 of the Networks Copyright Interpretation should be applied to the 
present case. In accordance with Article 5, only when the content service 
provider has ‘actual knowledge’ or notice of the claimed infringement, 
can the service provider’s failure to remove or disable access to the 
infringing materials be regarded as an act of assisting another’s infringing 
activity. In this sense, it could be argued that since Article 5 does not 
include the words ‘should have known’, even if the directly infringing 
activity performed by others would have been obvious to any reasonable 
person in that position, the service provider is not responsible for its act 
which contributed to the direct infringement, unless the copyright owner 
can prove the service provider had ‘actual knowledge’. 
In that case, the respondent (the sound recording producers) did not 
serve a notice on the appellant before commencing proceedings. 
Therefore, if Article 5 was applied to the case, it is likely the appellant 
would have been successful due to the lack of evidence regarding its 
‘actual knowledge’. However, the High Court was of the view that 
Article 5 was an inappropriate clause to resolve the dispute. The High 
Court stated (emphasis added): 
‘(Article 5) does not apply to all kinds of service providers . . . It 
only applies to those service providers that cannot monitor the 
information (transmitted through the network) through a duty 
of care. Nevertheless, as far as the service provided by the 
appellant is concerned, the appellant selected the websites and 
                                                        
30 See Beijing High People’s Court, Civil Judgment (2004) Gao Min Zhong Zi No. 713. 
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resources to be linked . . . It is apparent that the appellant is 
capable of scrutinising the legality of the linked files one by one. 
At the same time, since the appellant is a professional profit-
making music website, it should have a higher duty of care 
placed on the legality of its service. Therefore, the above Article 5 
cannot be applied to determine the appellant’s fault and liability . . . 
Should the duty of care of similar service providers be 
exempted, those service providers might ignore the right 
owners’ legitimate interests and indulge others’ infringing 
activity, and public interest will be harmed in the end’.31 
The High Court was of the opinion that the appellant should have 
known that the linked music files were infringing, since the appellant 
selected the music files to be linked, and had the chance to review 
whether those files were authorised to be communicated through the 
network. 
Universal Music Group v Jining’s Window Information Ltd 
The Beijing High Court’s position was not followed by the Supreme 
Court. In 2005 Universal Music Group sued Jining’s Window 
Information Ltd, a service provider that also provided links to sound 
recording files stored on other publicly available websites. The plaintiff 
did not notify the defendant of the claimed infringing nature of the 
linked music files before commencing the lawsuit. 
The judges in the Jining Intermediate Court were divided over whether 
the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s right of network 
communication. Some judges supported the views of the Beijing No 1 
Intermediate Court in Universal Music Group v chinamp3.com in that 
providing links to infringing works was not merely providing a corridor 
to the works, but was a communication of the works. These judges 
believed that because the defendant was negligent in reviewing the 
legality of the linked resources, the defendant was therefore responsible 
                                                        
31 Ibid.  
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for its act of communicating works to the public through the Internet.32 
Other judges opposed the above view and stated that (emphasis added): 
‘Providing links involves neither uploading music files (to a 
website server) nor communication (of works through the 
Internet). Since Internet websites are publicly accessible, 
interconnected and provide numerous types of information, it 
is impractical to request that the service provider identify and 
filter infringing files from among its linked resources. Thus the 
act of providing links itself is not an infringement of others’ 
copyright. However since the link providers are technically 
capable of controlling the linkage between its website and 
others’ websites, the link providers are obliged to take measures 
to disable the link immediately after becoming aware that the 
linked files are infringing. Only when the link provider does not 
disable the link in good time, and this results in the infringing 
files being further communicated, is the link provider liable for 
infringement. In the present case, the plaintiff did not warn the 
defendant in any manner, and the defendant disabled the links 
immediately after it was served by the claimant. In accordance 
with the Networks Copyright Interpretation, the defendant should 
not be liable for infringement.’33 
Since the judges were divided in the Jining Intermediate Court, they 
asked for instruction from the Shandong High Court, which in turn 
referred the inquiry to the Supreme Court. On 2 June, the Supreme 
Court made a reply to the Shandong High Court and then forwarded the 
reply to all the other courts. The reply states that (emphasis added): 
‘When the Internet service provider has actual knowledge of the 
infringing activity (of others), or continues to provide links (to 
infringing files) after the copyright owner sent it a warning of 
claimed infringement with good evidence, (the courts) may 
                                                        
32 (Supreme Court’s) Instruction: Whether Jinning Window Information Ltd’s Act of Providing 
Links Infringes the Right of Network Communication Owned by the Sound Recording Producer and 
How to Calculate the Amount of Damages, Document No 7 (2005), Shandong High Court. 
33 Ibid.  
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impose liability on the service provider in accordance with 
Article 4 of the Networks Copyright Interpretation’.34 
The reply from the Supreme Court left alone the question of whether 
the act of providing links to works is an act of communicating works to 
the public. The reply did affirm that the service provider’s ‘actual 
knowledge’ of the infringing nature of the linked resources, which can 
only be proved by serving a notice in advance, is necessary to impose 
any liability on the service provider. In other words, even if the service 
provider is fully aware of the facts or circumstances from which the 
infringing nature of the linked resources is apparent, and the service 
provider ‘should have known’ or ‘must have known’ of the infringement, 
no liability can be imposed on the service provider unless the copyright 
owner issues a notice.  
This position contradicts the Beijing High Court’s decision in Universal 
Music Group v chinamp3.com. However since the Supreme Court’s official 
reply is binding on the lower courts, the reply remains effective unless it 
is overruled by new legislation adopted by the National Peoples’ 
Congress or the State Council, or a new judicial interpretation is issued 
by the Supreme Court. Thus the only way to establish that the service 
provider has ‘actual knowledge’ of the infringing activity that occurs on 
the linked website is to send a notice to the service provider providing 
the linking service. Also damages can only be calculated from the date 
the service provider refused to disable the links to the infringing 
resources, no matter how obvious the infringing nature of the linked 
resources is, or how much profit the service provider made before 
receiving the notice. 
The implication of the new question on linking service and P2P 
service 
Since the key question of ‘who communicates works to the public 
through the network’ is not clearly answered by the Copyright Law 1990 
(amended 2001) or the Supreme Court, the Chinese courts have a difficult 
task in deciding challenging cases. 
                                                        
34 Reply No 2, the Third Court of Civil Branch, Supreme Court (2005). 
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Push Sound Co v Baidu 
Baidu.com is not only a NASDAQ-listed firm, but also the biggest web 
search engine in China. In addition to maintaining an ordinary search 
mechanism similar to Google and Yahoo, Baidu also provides an ‘MP3 
search service’ (http://mp3.baidu.com). When a user types the titles of 
popular songs in the search box, a list of links to sound recording files 
with the same or similar titles is displayed, along with a description of 
the size, format (MP3, WMA or RM) and connection speed of the linked 
files. After clicking the link, the linked music files would be downloaded 
from the remote website on which they were stored onto the user’s 
computer. 
Below the search box there are also music charts including New Singles 
Top 100, Singles Top 500, MP3 Chart and Chinese Singles Chart, as well 
as a catalogue of popular artists. After clicking on a chart a user would 
see a list of music files ranked in order of popularity. By clicking the 
artist’s name a user could then view music files arranged in alphabetical 
order by song title. By clicking a song title the user could begin 
downloading the linked music file onto their personal computer. 
Push Sound - an EMI subsidy company - found that 46 songs from 
sound recordings it had produced could be downloaded through the 
links located on Baidu’s website. In June 2005 Push Sound sued Baidu 
for infringing its exclusive right to communicate sound recordings to the 
public through the Internet. As the factual background of this case is 
very similar to Universal Music Group v chinamp3.com, the court had the 
opportunity to clarify whether the link provider communicates the 
linked work to the public. 
However the Beijing Hadian District Court’s analysis of the case was 
ambiguous. On one hand, the court pointed out that ‘the act of 
providing links only involves the titles of songs and the names of artists, 
not the content of the song which should not be deemed an 
infringement’. On the other hand, the court emphasised that the 
defendant’s service was not ‘introducing the artistic value of the music 
files in question and providing information’, but for ‘making profit by 
exploiting MP3 files’, which ‘goes beyond what a search engine should 
do’. The court said that the defendant in providing the linking service 
did not confirm the legality of the MP3 file sources in advance or obtain 
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the plaintiff’s consent, and that since the service ‘impedes the plaintiff in 
communicating its sound recordings through the Internet’, the 
defendant’s act was infringing.35 
No clear legal grounds for the judgement can be inferred from the above 
reasoning, and the language used by the court could impose copyright 
liability on any search engine. For example, since Google’s ‘image search 
engine’ can ‘introduce the artistic value’ of an image and enable a user to 
locate and download the image file itself, Google could be considered to 
be ‘exploiting’ image files. It should be noted that Google does not seek 
the consent of the copyright owner of on-line images or confirm the 
legality of the on-line images in advance either. Should Google be liable 
for infringement of copyright in the images simply because it provides 
an image searching service and ‘impedes the plaintiff communicating its 
image through the Internet’? 
It appears that the only possible basis for the judgement is the fact that 
when the music file begins to download, a pop-up window claims that 
the MP3 file comes from mp3.baidu.com. It is reasonable for the court 
to assume that the downloaded files are stored on the defendant’s server 
and that the defendant uploaded these infringing music files onto its 
server.36 If this were the case, the defendant would be held to have 
communicated sound recordings to the public through the Internet and 
would have thus violated the plaintiff’s copyright in the sound 
recordings.  
On appeal it would be easy for Baidu to overthrow this assumption by 
proving that all the downloadable music files are stored on remote 
websites.37 Without first clarifying whether Baidu communicates music 
files to the public by providing links to the music files, it is nearly 
impossible for the court to give a sound judgement. 
                                                        
35 Beijing Haidian District People’s Court, Civil Judgment (2005) Hai Min Chu Zi No. 
14665. 
36 Regrettably, although the judgment mentioned this fact, it did not clarify its legal 
significance. Thus the real legal ground of the judgment is still questionable. 
37 Baidu has already appealed the ruling of the first instance to Beijing No. Intermediate 
Court, but at the time of writing, no decision had been delivered. 
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Push Sound Co v Fashionow38 
The Fashionow Company is China’s version of Napster. Like Napster, 
Fashionow facilitates the transmission of MP3 files between its users 
through its free distribution of the P2P music share software ‘Kuro’. 
Any user who has installed Kuro and paid the service fee necessary for 
registration can search for and download MP3 music files stored on 
other users' computers through the Internet. After the user has 
downloaded the MP3 files, these files are then available for downloading 
by other Kuro users, provided the user is logged onto the Kuro system. 
Kuro appears to operate in a similar manner to Napster rather than 
Grokster, since it depends on Fashionow’s server to search for MP3 
files.39 The trial court, Beijing No. 2 Intermediary People’s Court, held 
that the two defendants should be liable for copyright infringement 
because they were providing the ‘Kuro’ software and platform and 
making profits through the platform.40 
In what was the first case in China to involve copyright infringement of 
a P2P service provider, Push Sound claimed that Fashionow infringed its 
right of network communication. Interestingly the claim in this case is 
the same as that in Universal Music Group v chinamp3.com and Push Sound Co 
v Baidu, and the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant assisted or 
contributed to the users’ copyright infringement. As a result there still 
remains the question of whether the defendant communicates music to 
the public through the Internet. Here the defendant only facilitated 
communication by providing the Kuro software and ‘search index’ 
service through its server. There is no clear answer to the whether such 
facilitation is deemed communication. 
 
                                                        
38 See Beijing No. 2 Intermediary People’s Court, Civil Judgement (2005) Er Zhong Min 
Chu Zi No. 13739. 
39 This is disclosed by the criminal judgment delivered by  Taiwan Taipei Disctrict Court, 
since the Kuro software distributed in Taiwan and Mainland China is the same. However, 
this conclusion has not been affirmed by the court in Mainland China. For more 
information, see the Taiwan Taipei District Court Criminal Judgement 92 Nian Du Su No. 
2146. 
40 See Beijing No. 2 Intermediary People’s Court, Civil Judgement (2005) Er Zhong Min 
Chu Zi No. 13739. 
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SUGGESTION ON APPROPRIATELY IMPLEMENTING 
THE WCT ARTICLE 8 IN CHINA 
Only the uploader communicates works to the public through 
the network 
One of the keys to resolving the above two cases and future cases 
involving Internet service providers liability is to determine whether and 
when a service provider communicates works to the public through the 
Internet. As mentioned, the Beijing No 1 Intermediate Court and some 
judges in the Jining Intermediate Court argued that when a service 
provider enables users to directly download music files by clicking links 
to these files, the service provider communicates the music to the public 
through the Internet.  
This conclusion, which is wrong, is the result of misunderstanding the 
wording of ‘makes work available’ in Article 8 of the WCT. If the act of 
providing links was communication, then the act falls under the direct 
control of the right of network communication. It follows that anybody 
who provides a link to an infringing file is directly infringing the right of 
network communication, regardless of their intent.  
The judge responsible for delivering the opinion for the Beijing No 1 
Intermediate Court in Universal Music Group v chinamp3.com 41  wrote a 
commentary in which he declared that ‘the defendant directly performed 
the infringing act’. 42  If that was the case, the court’s discussion of 
negligence in concluding that the service provider (the defendant) 
infringed upon the copyright would be redundant, because the intent to 
infringe is not a condition necessary to constitute a direct infringement. 
Obviously, that conclusion is not only absurd, but also a disaster for 
search engines since it is impossible for search engines to avoid 
providing links to infringing works. 
                                                        
41 Go East Entertainment Co., Ltd (A Universal Music Company) v. Beijing Centry 
Yuebo Technology Co., Ltd (owner of chinamp3.com) See Beijing No. 1 Intermediary 
People’s Court, Civil Judgement (2004) Yi Zhong Min Chu Zi No.400, 
<http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=9868&k_w=chinamp3> at 16 January 
2008. 
42 Liu Yong, The Determination of Infringing Act among Network Linkages and the Application of 
Law (in Chinese), <http://www.bjd.com.cn/fghd/fghd-8.htm> at 1 February 2006.  
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In my view, only the act of uploading or otherwise copying works onto a 
publicly accessible server or ‘shared directory’ on a personal computer 
hard drive, which the public can access at a place and time chosen by 
them, is the act of communicating works to the public. Any other acts 
which facilitate this act, including providing links to these works and 
distributing P2P software with a ‘search index’ service, would not fall 
within the category of communicating works to the public. 
In the case of links, even if all of the users access the work stored on a 
remote website through the links provided, it is those responsible for 
uploading the works to the remote website that have communicated the 
works to the public through the Internet. Link providers only facilitate 
the existing communication; they do not make new communication.  
In Universal Music Group v chinamp3.com the Beijing No 1 Intermediate 
Court made an analogy between a remote website to which links are 
provided and a ‘periphery storage’ (like a removable hard disk drive) to 
which a personal computer is connected. 43 Just like the operator of the 
personal computer, who in choosing content from the removable hard 
disk to display on the computer is responsible for what the computer 
screen shows, the service provider in choosing specific files on the 
remote website and creating links to those files communicates them to 
the public.44 
The analogy for ‘periphery storage’ is flawed: but for the act of the 
personal computer operator, others would have no access to the content 
stored in the removable hard disk. In sharp contrast to this, even if the 
service provider removed or disabled all the links to the files stored on 
the remote website, users are still able to log on to the remote website 
and access those files. As the Beijing High Court noted in the Universal 
Music Group v chinamp3.com appeal, if the remote website employs a code 
to restrict access to the files or deletes the files, the links to these files 
will no longer enable users to get them. 
                                                        
43 See Beijing No. 1 Intermediary People’s Court, Civil Judgement (2004) Yi Zhong Min 
Chu Zi No.400, 
<http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=9868&k_w=chinamp3> at 16 January 
2008. 
44 Beijing No 1 Intermediate Court does not say this specifically in Universal Music Group v 
chinamp3.com, however this is what the analogy means. 
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A new analogy might be useful to clarify who is the communicator of 
works. In the traditional paper environment, if a bookshop sells pirated 
books it distributes works to the public by selling pirated copies without 
the copyright owner’s consent, and thereby infringes on the exclusive 
right of distribution. If another shop sells a map with the location of the 
‘pirated bookshop’ clearly marked, or drives customers to the ‘pirated 
bookshop’, this shop does not directly infringe the right of distribution 
of the copyright owner. Provided the shop does not sell pirated books 
itself, the shop’s actions, including providing the map or sending 
customers over, only facilitates and contributes to the act of distribution 
performed by the pirated bookshop. It is only a contributory 
infringement of the right of distribution if the shop knows, or should 
have known that the other bookshop is infringing upon others 
copyright. 
The Federal Court of Australia recently confirmed this reasoning in 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper. 45 Like the Chinese Copyright Law 
1990 (amended 2001) the Australian Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) 
Act 2000 introduced a new ‘right to communicate the work to the 
public’. 46  ‘Communicate’ is defined as including ‘(to) make available 
online a work or other subject matter.’47 
The factual background of this Australian case is very similar to that of 
Push Sound Co v Baidu, in that a music website provided highly structured 
links to music sound recording files stored on remote websites. The 
copyright owner claimed that the operator of the music website (Mr 
Cooper) directly infringed on the copyright in the music sound 
recordings by communicating these recordings to the public.48 In reply 
Judge Tamberlin stated that: 
‘I am not satisfied that the Cooper website has "made available" the 
music sound recordings within the meaning of that expression. It is 
the remote websites which make available the sound recordings and 
                                                        
45 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 [57]. 
46 Copyright Act (Cth) ss 31(1)(a)(iv), 31(1)(b)(iii). In relation to second recordings 
copyright, see s 85. 
47 Copyright Act (Cth) s 10(1). 
48 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 [57], see further B Fitzgerald et 
al, ‘Internet and E-Commerce Law’ (2007), Chapter 4. 
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from which the digital music files are downloaded as a result of a 
request transmitted to the remote website.’49 
‘The music sound recordings have initially been made available to 
the public by being placed on the remote websites . . . the digital 
music files to which links were provided on the Cooper website 
were also available to users through the Internet generally.’50 
There is no reason why the same conclusion cannot be reached by 
Chinese courts since the ‘right of network communication’ in China and 
the ‘right to communicate the work to the public’ in Australia both 
originate from Article 8 of the WCT. 
‘Red flag’ test should be applied to determine ISP’s knowledge 
of infringement  
Article 4 of the Networks Copyright Interpretation requires content service 
providers to have ‘actual knowledge’ of the infringement before 
imposing liability on the service provider as the joint tortfeasor. The 
reply given by the Supreme Court in Universal Music Group v Jining’s 
Window Information Ltd extends this rule to service providers who have 
created or maintained links to other websites. As a result, the copyright 
owner of the linked work cannot succeed in a lawsuit against the website 
operator who has provided the links, unless the copyright owner has 
already sent a warning to the website operator. 
In my opinion, such interpretations do not strike a proper balance 
between the policy of protecting the interest of the copyright owner and 
promoting information technology. A notice sent by the copyright 
owner is not the only way to prove the service provider had actual 
knowledge of the infringing activities that occurred on remote websites. 
On many occasions, either the surrounding circumstances or common 
sense would cause a reasonable person in the same position to have 
known that infringing activities were taking place. When a service 
provider should have known of the infringing nature of the files stored 
on remote websites but has still created or maintained the links to these 
files, it is unfair to overlook the obvious fault of the service provider and 
                                                        
49 Ibid [63]. 
50 Ibid [64]. 
The new right of communication through the information network in the PRC 
 
214 
exempt its liability for contributory infringement, while allowing the 
service provider to make a profit from facilitating communication of the 
infringing files from the remote website. 
In the United States Senate Report on the The Digital Millenium 
Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA),51 the so-called ‘red flag’ test is described 
as the ‘applicable knowledge standard’: 
‘If the service provider becomes aware of a "red flag" from 
which infringing activity is apparent, it will lose the limitation of 
liability if it takes no action . . . in deciding whether those facts 
or circumstances constitute a "red flag" - in other words, 
whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a 
reasonable person operating under the same or similar 
circumstances - an objective standard should be used.’52 
The Report goes on to apply the red flag test to ‘information location 
tools’ including the directories or indexes of on-line sites or material 
(emphasis added): 
‘A service provider would qualify for this safe harbor if, among 
other requirements, it "does not have actual knowledge that the 
material or activity is infringing" or, in the absence of such 
actual knowledge, it is "not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent." Under this standard, 
a service provider would . . . not qualify for the safe harbor if it 
had turned a blind eye to "red flags" of obvious infringement.’53 
‘The important intended objective of this standard is to exclude 
sophisticated "pirate" directories which refer Internet users to 
other selected Internet sites where pirate software, books, 
movies, and music can be downloaded or transmitted from the 
safe harbor . . . Because the infringing nature of such sites 
                                                        
51 United States Senate Report 105-190, 105th Congress 2d. 
<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_reports&docid=f:sr190.105> at 16 January 2008. 
52 United States Senate Report 105-190, 105th Congress 2d Session, 44. 
<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_reports&docid=f:sr190.105> at 16 January 2008. 
53 Ibid 48. 
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would be apparent from even a brief and casual viewing, safe harbor 
status for a provider that views such a site and then establishes 
a link to it would not be appropriate.’54 
‘The common-sense result of this ‘red flag’ test is that . . . if, 
however, an Internet site is obviously pirate, then seeing it may 
be all that is needed for the service provider to encounter a " 
red flag"’.55 
In a digital era where the standard of ‘knowledge’ or ‘fault’ of Internet 
service providers is highly harmonised across the world, if the Chinese 
legislature and courts were to deny the ‘red flag’ test this would not allow 
for the effective protection of copyright over the Internet.  
Taking Baidu’s case as an example, Baidu manually created such 
categories as ‘list of artists’ and organised links to the sound recording 
files. When the name of an artist is clicked, all the song titles contained 
in the album will be displayed. Clicking a title will begin the process of 
downloading the sound recording file from a remote website. Since 
these artists are the most popular singers in China and work for major 
record labels it is highly unlikely that these record labels would consent 
to a website making their sound recordings freely available for 
downloading. Baidu, after having a brief and casual viewing of the artists’ 
names and song titles would have realised the infringing nature of the 
linked sound recording files. In other words, the artists’ names and song 
titles which were displayed in Baidu’s categories constitute ‘red flags’ 
which Baidu should have noticed. However, Baidu turned a blind eye to 
the ‘red flags’ of what was obviously linked, pirated sound recording 
files. As a result, Baidu should be held liable, because it was through 
providing or maintaining links that Baidu contributed to the direct 
infringement of the right of network communication that was 
performed by remote websites.  
In contrast, the ‘search box’ provided by Baidu is specially designed to 
search audio files over the Internet and does not constitute an act of 
contributory infringement. Before a user types a keyword in the ‘search 
box’, the results of automatic searching remain unknown. The links 
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displayed might point to popular sound recording files which were 
uploaded onto remote websites without authorisation, but they might 
also refer the user to lawful audio files, such as sound clips of a speech 
given by President Bush. Without the copyright owner sending a notice 
stating that the URL is associated with allegedly infringing files, it is 
unjustified to assume that Baidu intended to facilitate the 
communication of infringing sound recordings. Apparently Baidu’s 
‘audio files search box’ is just like a Sony Betamax VCR which is 
‘capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses’. 56  Without 
further evidence of Baidu’s intent to promote infringement occurring on 
remote websites, as Grokster and StreamCast Networks did, the court 
should not hold Baidu liable for copyright infringement.  
Fortunately the Communication Right Regulation does not seem to base the 
liability of contributory infringement on ‘actual knowledge’ of the 
infringement.  In Article 22 it provides (emphasis added):  
‘A network service provider which provides an information 
storage space to a service recipient, thus enabling the service 
recipient to make available to the public through information 
network a work, performance, or sound or video recording, and 
which meets the following conditions, bears no liability for 
compensation: 
   … 
   (3) it does not know or has no reasonable grounds to know that the 
work, performance, or sound or video recording made available 
by the service recipient is an infringement;  
…’ 
Article 23 further provides (emphasis added):  
‘A network service provider which provides searching or 
linking service to a service recipient and which, upon receiving 
a written notification of the right owner, disconnects the link to 
an infringing work, performance, or sound or video recording 
in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations bears no 
                                                        
56 442, 78 L Ed 2d 574, 104 S Ct 774. 
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liability for compensation; however, if it knows or has reasonable 
grounds to know that the linked work, performance, or sound or 
video recording is an infringement, it shall bear the liability for 
contributory infringement. ’ 
Compared to the Networks Copyright Interpretation and the Supreme 
Court’s reply in Universal Music Group v Jining’s Window Information Ltd, the 
Communication Right Regulation shifts the burden of proof to the service 
provider. In other words, when the website operated by the service 
provider provides infringing materials or links pointing to infringing 
materials, the service provider should bear the burden of proving that it 
does not know these materials are infringing. In addition, the copyright 
owner is able to prevail by proving that the service provider ‘has 
reasonable grounds to know’ the infringing materials and has failed to 
take down or disable access to the material. If the Regulation is adopted it 
would be a great step forward in protecting copyright in the digital 
environment. However, the standard of ‘should have known’ requires 
further clarification either through future judicial interpretation or 
specific cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As this chapter highlights, China has done much to meet international 
standards by introducing the network communication right. In the next 
few years, we will see the scope and meanings of this right further 
refined in China. 
 
   
 
